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Abstract
We analyze the question whether or not quantum theory should be used to
describe single particles. Our final result is that a rational basis for such an ’indi-
viduality interpretation’ does not exist. A critical examination of three principles,
supporting the individuality interpretation, leads to the result that no one of these
principles seems to be realized in nature. The well-known controversy character-
ized by the names of Einstein (EPR), Bohr and Bell is analyzed. EPR proved
’predictive incompleteness’ of quantum theory, which implies that no individuality
interpretation exists. Contrary to the common opinion, Bell’s proof of ’metaphys-
ical completeness’ does not invalidate EPR’s proof because two crucially different
meanings of ’completeness’ are involved. The failure to distinguish between these
two meanings is closely related to a fundamentally deterministic world view, which
dominated the thinking of the 19th century and determines our thinking even today.
1 Introduction
The question formulated in the title of this essay requires first clarification of a semantic
point. An interpretation cannot be wrong in the same sense as an experimentally ver-
ifiable theoretical prediction. The term ’wrong’ is used here in the sense of ’extremely
misleading’. In this sense a wrong interpretation leads to paradoxical contradictions or
to internal inconsistencies such as unsolvable theoretical problems. I will first formulate
some basic assumptions and explain what ’individuality interpretation’ means before I
will try to answer the question.
I start by formulating the most important assumptions underlying this work. A phys-
ical theory is a set of equations together with a number of rules how to compare theo-
retical and experimental results. Predictions, i.e. real numbers obtained by solving the
basic equations using input data referring to earlier times, represent the core of a physical
theory. The interpretation of the mathematical terms is also part of a physical theory. It
gives ’meaning’ to the mathematical variables, but does not affect the predictive core of
the theory. Several different interpretations of one mathematical formalism are possible.
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They lead to slightly different physical theories but cannot make a physical theory right
or wrong, since they do not affect the predictive core of the theory. We may say that
a theory is given by a set of predictions (which constitute the invariant core) and an
interpretation.
What, exactly, does ’individuality interpretation’ mean ? A physical theory which
allows prediction of single (individual) events, in particular predictions about single par-
ticles, must necessarily be interpreted in this sense. For classical mechanics this individu-
ality interpretation is obviously correct. Such a theory could also be called a deterministic
theory, because it claims to predict the behavior of individual particles ’with certainty’.
There is no room in such a theory for uncertainty, all predictions of this individualistic
theory have a probability equal to one . Testing the predictions of this theory requires a
single experiment.
On the other hand there are physical theories, expressed in a completely ’determin-
istic’ mathematical form, whose output cannot be verified in single experiments because
the scattering of data is too large to be neglected. Clearly, the output of a physical theory
must be testable. If it cannot be tested in individual experiments, essentially the only
possibility left is a statistical test. In this case the output of the theory is given by statis-
tical quantities like probabilities or expectation values. These numbers can be compared
with experimental results and verified or falsified just as the output of the deterministic
theories discussed above. But in order to do this an infinite number of individual systems,
all prepared in the same way, have to be studied experimentally. This is the way sta-
tistical measurements have to be performed in principle (in practice simpler possibilities
exist), no other testable meaning (namely ”frequentist probability’) can be ascribed to
the term probability in a physical context. A statistical theory can obviously not be used
o make predictions about individual events, because such predictions cannot be verified
in individual experiments.
From the present discussion one would expect - considering the above, rather weak
assumptions as evident - that no physical theory whose output is given by statistical
quantities can be interpreted in an individualistic sense. In particular, one would expect
that this holds true for quantum theory (QT), whose output is of a probabilistic nature.
On the other hand, the dominating interpretation of QT tells us that quantum mechanics
is a theory about individual particles. We have been using phrases like ’the Schro¨dinger
equation of a single electron’ or ’the quantum mechanical description of a single particle’
an infinite number of times. This kind of talking determines our thinking. The idea that
QT describes individual events and particles presents the basis for much, if not most, of
current research on foundations of physics.
2 The conceptual basis of the individuality interpre-
tation of quantum theory
According to the assumptions above, an individuality interpretation of a probabilistic
theory does not make sense. This means that the boundaries of this simple framework
have to be left far behind in order to establish QT as a theory about single particles.
There are individuality interpretations which require more than a single universe or the
participation of the observer’s brain [3]. We shall not discuss such interpretations here but
restrict ourselves to the standard, Copenhagen interpretation (CI). In order to overcome
the fundamental conflict between deterministic and probabilistic predictions the CI denies
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the reality of unobserved properties [21]. The properties ’come into being’ by the act
of measurement in a way which is unknown and presents an unsolvable ’measurement
problem’. The CI ’solves’ the fundamental conflict in a sophistic sense because it is not the
task of a physical theory to make predictions about non-existing things. But it does not
answer the question how things come back to reality. The CI’s claim for an individuality
interpretation may also be expressed by the statement that QT is a ’complete’ theory
as regards the description of individual particles; a more detailed analysis of the term
’complete’ will be given in section 4.
The CI shows several strange features, which have as a common origin the switching
forth and back between reality and un-reality of properties as observation begins and
ends. This problem becomes more stringent if two conjugate properties (non-commuting
observables) have to be measured at the same time. A number of principles or concepts
have been introduced, by the founders of the CI, in order to support the individuality
interpretation and to explain its strange features. There seem to be essentially three such
principles. Let us begin with
• Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, the well-known inequality expressing the impos-
sibility to measure position and momentum of a single particle simultaneously with
arbitrary high precision.
This principle will be referred to as individual uncertainty principle (IUP). The IUP
presents the most important cornerstone of the CI because it supports, if true, the idea
that certain (conjugate) properties of a single microscopic system cannot be simultane-
ously real. The second concept supporting the CI is
• the particle-wave duality: Depending on the experimental situation individual mi-
croscopic systems may behave either like particles or like waves.
This idea can be considered as a complement to the IUP. In fact, according to the IUP
particles have either sharp values of position or of momentum, depending on the exper-
imental conditions. The former case corresponds to the particle picture, the latter to
the wave picture. The degree of reality of these two pictures is determined by the mea-
surement arrangement. The third idea supporting the CI is expressed as an assertion
about
• the classical limit of QT: Classical mechanics may be regarded as the limiting case
of quantum mechanics when ~ tends to zero [7]
The relevance of this last point for the individuality interpretation is obvious. If QT really
describes individual particles (for nonzero ~), then it should not change its character - as
a theory describing individual particles - if the limit ~→ 0 is performed. This limit must
agree with a classical individualistic theory, namely classical mechanics. Otherwise the
CI as an individuality interpretation must be called into doubt.
An important point to note is that no one of these three principles is part of the
quantum theoretical formalism. This means each one needs justification from experiment
or theory. A second important point is that these principles have been set up in the first
half of the last century and that enormous technological progress has been made since
then. A re-examination, taking today’s results into account, seems useful.
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3 Critical discussion of the conceptual basis of the
individuality interpretation
The philosophical idea that unobserved things cannot be ascribed reality goes back to
Aristotle and has Descartes and Berkeley as prominent advocates. It is in disagreement
with the common sense philosophy of physicists but this does, of course, not mean that
it can be rejected right from the start. Starting our analysis with the
• Uncertainty principle,
we should mention at the very beginning that Kennard’s inequality [14], which is com-
monly written in exactly the same form as the IUP, has a very different meaning. It
is a statistical relation which has nothing to do with the simultaneous measurement of
position and momentum but expresses the relationship of the statistical fluctuations of in-
dependently measured quantities. Its mathematical derivation from the framework of QT
is still sometimes erroneously considered as a confirmation of the IUP. The second point
to note is that Heisenberg’s famous Gedanken experiment connects the error in position
to the disturbance in momentum, and not to the error in momentum (the momentum is
assumed to be accurately known at the time of position measurement); see e.g. Margenau
and Park [20]. Therefore it seems that the universal acceptance of the IUP is based on
two historically-grown misunderstandings, namely the failures to distinguish individual
from statistical measurements and measurements from preparations.
Considerable efforts have been undertaken to derive Heisenberg-like relations from
QT. This requires, however, additional assumptions, forcing individuality concepts into
the statistical formalism of QT. The most important of these is the ’projection postulate’,
the assumption that the state vector jumps after a measurement into an eigenspace of
the corresponding operator. The details of this process, which is sometimes referred to
as ’non-unitary time evolution’, are unknown. This beautiful expression is used to hide
the fundamental difference between individual and statistical predictions. The projection
postulate was suggested by the ingenious mathematician von Neumann and seems very
convincing from the point of view of mathematical simplicity. But it may be a simple
error. In this context it must be mentioned that von Neumann’s proof of the non-existence
of hidden variables contains a simple error. It was quoted many times, as an argument in
favor of ’completeness’ of QT, during a period of more than thirty years (!), until the ’silly
error’ in its derivation became widely known [21]. All attempts to derive Heisenberg-like
relations from QT use this projection postulate, as well as other assumptions formulated
in the abstract language of Hilbert space [13]. Depending on the chosen assumptions
some authors derive relations similar to Heisenberg’s inequality [6] while others obtain
different expressions [22]. Several experimental violations of Heisenberg’s inequality have
been reported, the most recent one by Erhart et al. [10].
Most relevant for the CI’s claim of un-reality of unobserved properties is the IUP, i.e.
Heisenberg’s inequality interpreted as a relation between measurement errors of conjugate
properties. Astonishingly, the practical basis for the IUP seems to be still Heisenberg’s
famous light-microscope Gedanken experiment - despite the fact that it says nothing
about the simultaneous measurement of position and momentum. Thus, let us first ask
if other ”Gedanken experimente” have been designed which show a violation of the IUP.
This is indeed the case. Such idealized measurement arrangements have been proposed
by Prugovecki [27], Park and Margenau [24], Ballentine [1], Popper [26] and others. We
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may, secondly, ask, as a question of primary importance, if the IUP has ever be con-
firmed experimentally. Not a single experimental confirmation has been reported [6] since
Heisenberg’s creation of the IUP in 1927. On the other hand, data showing violations
of the IUP have been published. We mention, in particular, the realization of Poppers
thought experiment [26] by Kim and Shih [15].
Summing up, we find no experimental or theoretical facts supporting the IUP. This
principle does not seem to be an element of science, but rather a historically-grown habit
or an object of quasi-religious admiration.
• Particle-wave duality
Recent experiments by Tonomura [31] and others have shown that single particles are
always particles and never waves. A video on the Hitachi website [30] shows the devel-
opment of a double-slit interference pattern as a consequence of an increasing number
of electrons arriving at the screen. As pointed out by Silverman in his discussion of the
Tonomura experiment [29]: ”The manifestations of wave-like behavior are statistical in
nature and always emerge from the collective outcome of many electron events” Thus,
no mysterious transformation between particles and waves is required. The origin of the
miraculous ’particle-wave duality’ is poor resolution of early experimental data.
• The classical limit
The idea that classical mechanics must emerge as the classical limit of QT was advocated
by Bohr, Dirac and others. But this idea led to a large number of open questions and
contradictions. The problem becomes much simpler if one admits the possibility that
the classical limit of QT differs from classical mechanics. It has been mentioned before
that a straightforward application of the limit ~ → 0 to Schro¨dinger’s equation leads to
a classical probabilistic theory and not to classical mechanics [2, 18, 16] A recent, more
complete treatment [17] leads to the same conclusion.
To summarize, closer examination shows that neither the IUP, nor the wave-particle
duality, nor the claim that classical mechanics emerges as the classical limit of QT present
physically well-defined concepts. No support is provided for the philosophical idea that
unobserved properties are not real and for the related idea that an individuality inter-
pretation of QT exists. On top of that, this also implies that a fundamental and very
successful methodical principle of physics, namely the principle of reductionism, can not
be universally valid. This principle is not compatible with the statistical interpretation of
QT. As is well-known, the scientific community decided to keep the philosophical dogma
of reductionism along with the individuality interpretation of QT. From a psychological
point of view this is understandable, since we expect science to yield predictions with
certainty, but the question is how much weight should be given to psychological expecta-
tions.
4 EPR, Bohr, Bell, and two meanings of ’complete-
ness’
Present research on foundations of QT is strongly influenced by a paper published in 1935
by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) [9]. There is an enormous secondary literature,
see e.g. Fine [11], Ballentine [1], Redhead [28], and the author’s website [16]. In this
work, EPR claim that the quantum-mechanical description of reality is incomplete. The
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CI is attacked ’from inside’ because the basic assumptions used in this paper do not
reflect the positions of the authors but are part of the CI. The most significant example is
EPR’s assumption that ”The state of the particle is completely characterized by a wave
function ψ”, a statement in sharp opposition to Einstein’s well-documented opinion that
ψ describes an ensemble. EPR’s conclusion was, of course, attacked by CI’s advocates
who considered QT as a complete theory. However, a discussion of the specific EPR
problem was generally avoided and EPR’s claim of incompleteness of QT was attacked
on different routes - circumventing the specific problem. Bohr, in his reply, took a very
philosophical, elusive route, which was not really convincing for many people.
According to the prevailing opinion this question was decided in favor of Bohr by the
work of John Bell [5, 4], about thirty years later. Bell circumvented the specific EPR
problem by relating it to the problem of hidden variables. A (local) hidden variable
theory is compatible with all predictions of QT providing, however, at the same time, a
more detailed (deterministic) description of reality. Physical intuition tells us that such
a thing cannot exist but Bell proved that it cannot exist - at least within the framework
of his postulates; all no-go proofs are of course only valid within a certain ’universe of
discourse’ (repeated remarks on this important limitation will be omitted from now on for
brevity). He formulated general conditions for local hidden variable theories and derived
therefrom an inequality which differs from the corresponding prediction of QT. Thus, he
showed that hidden variable theories cannot exist if QT is correct. This shows that QT
is a ’complete’ theory (with the meaning of ’complete’ given in context). This reasoning
seems correct but the question is what can be concluded from it. The simplest conclusion
is that EPR’s proof of incompleteness of QT cannot be true because Bell showed that QT
is complete. I claim that this simple reasoning is not justified because a subtle semantic
trap, concerning the meaning(s) of the word ’complete’, has been overlooked.
The word complete has two different meanings. If used to characterize the predictive
power of a physical theory it means: ”All facts that can be observed can be predicted (with
certainty)”. This kind of completeness could be called ’predictive completeness’, or ’p-
completeness’ for brevity. In order to find out if a physical theory is p-complete one needs
solutions (predictions) of this theory and experiments testing these predictions. This first
kind of completeness may equivalently be characterized by saying that an ’individuality
interpretation’ for this (p-complete) theory exists. The standard example for a p-complete
theory is classical mechanics. Classical massless field theories are of a similar nature but
do not directly describe individual particles.
The second meaning of the word complete can be described as follows: ”No better
theory, in the sense of producing more ’definite’ (deterministic) predictions, exists”. This
is a very strong assertion. It entails not only the concrete physical theory under discussion
but also an infinite number of other theories (all unknown), which are all not allowed
to exist according to the assertion. Such an assertion can of course only be verified
within a certain ’universe of discourse’, which may possibly be generalized in later steps.
But it can be approached nevertheless. Let us call this second kind of completeness
’metaphysical completeness’, or ’m-completeness’. As an example, we mention classical
probabilistic theories where the uncertainty is only in the initial conditions while the
movement in phase space is deterministic [19]. These theories are m-incomplete, with
classical mechanics playing the role of the ’better theory’.
How are these two kinds of completeness related to each other ? A p-complete theory
is also m-complete. It would not make sense to search for a better theory than classical
mechanics (in its range of validity) because classical mechanics makes already predictions
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with probability equal to one. This means, the implication
p-completeness ⇒ m-completeness, (1)
holds true. This means that m-incompleteness implies p-incompleteness and that p-
incompleteness is a necessary condition for m-incompleteness. On the other hand p-
incompleteness is not a sufficient condition for m-incompleteness. A p-incomplete theory
may be either m-complete or m-incomplete.
Let us now reconsider the EPR-Bohr-Bell question using this refined vocabulary. What
Bell proved is obviously m-completeness of QT. In EPR’s paper both kinds of completeness
occur. In the last paragraph EPR express their believe that QT is m-incomplete:
”We believe however that such a [more complete] theory is possible”
The communication of EPR’s ’believe’ (which had been known for a long time) is of course
not the central message of EPR. The central message is given by the logical deductions
reported in the body of the paper, i.e. in the whole paper except the last paragraph. So,
which kind of completeness is referred to in the body of EPR’s paper ? The subject of the
paper is the problem of predictions of the values of certain observables, thus what EPR
mean by completeness is obviously p-completeness. An assertion of m-incompleteness,
i.e. a statement that a better theory then QT must exist, can nowhere be found in the
relevant part (the body) of EPR’s paper.
The proof of p-incompleteness of QT was of course a necessary prerequisite for EPR’s
’believe’ in a deterministic replacement of QT. If an analysis had led to the conclusion
that QT is p-complete, this had also implied that QT is m-complete. On the other hand,
EPR were aware of the fact that p-incompleteness is only a necessary and not a sufficient
condition for m-incompleteness. Thus, they were aware of the fact that their proof of
p-incompleteness of QT did not imply m-incompleteness of QT. They express this in the
first sentence of the last paragraph of their paper in a very clear way:
”While we have thus shown that the wave function does not provide a complete
description of physical reality, we left open the question of whether or not such
a description exists”.
It is a real mystery why this clear statement, separating cleanly the two different kinds
of completeness (made even more explicit in the present essay only by means of different
names) from each other, has been overlooked by the scientific community.
It follows that Bell’s proof of m-completeness cannot be used, even if we accept
the assumptions underlying his proof [12], as an argument against EPR’s proof of p-
incompleteness of QT. Bell was in error, when claiming that his results contradict EPR
! If we accept both Bell’s and EPR’s findings we arrive at the final conclusion that QT
is p-incomplete and m-complete. This conclusion is compatible with a recent derivation
of non-relativistic quantum theory from statistical postulates [19, 23] and agrees roughly
with the common sense assessment of QT as a correct (complete) statistical (incomplete)
theory. It implies that an individuality interpretation of QT is not justified.
The present conclusion can only be avoided if one takes a deterministic point of view of
the world, namely that everything that can be observed must in principle be predictable.
This then means that p-incompleteness implies m-incompleteness (or the existence of
a hidden variable theory). But note that this implication, which eliminates our final
conclusion, is not a logical requirement but the consequence of a new (in fact, very old)
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philosophical dogma. From the point of view of physics such a deterministic dogma is not
required. Interestingly, this deterministic point of view was shared by Einstein and Bohr
(see [16] for a more detailed explanation), despite their otherwise very different opinions.
It was denied by several other authors, in particular by Popper [25]. Unfortunately,
today’s discussions are still centered around the two alternatives represented by Einstein
and Bohr.
5 More recent developments
Recent years have shown a tendency to reinterpret the body of EPR’s paper as a proof
of m-incompleteness. The sharp contrast between the ’believe’ in the last paragraph and
the science in the body of the paper had to be hidden somehow. The paper was so to
say ’rewritten’ as a hidden variable theory, ’elements of reality’ became hidden variables.
However, the real EPR paper is not a hidden variable theory but the construction of an
internal contradiction within the CI. It is certainly true that EPR’s conclusion implies
the possibility of a more complete description. However they have not shown that such
a more complete description exists. The only way to do this is to construct a ’better’
(hidden variable) theory for QT. Nothing like that can be found in EPR’s paper.
As a further development, which will be dealt with only briefly, the validity of EPR’s
final conclusion has been discussed in conjunction with the validity of their basic assump-
tions. According to the late Einstein, EPR’s final conclusion may be rewritten as the
statement that not both of the following two assertions (quoted literally from [8]) can be
true:
1. The description by means of the Psi-function is complete.
2. The real states of spatially separated objects are independent from each other.
Today, the second assertion is frequently split into the assertions of ’locality’ and ’reality’
(see e.g. Wiseman [32]). Incompleteness with regard to predictions of individual events
is a familiar feature. On the other hand a breakdown of ’locality’ or ’reality’ presents
a much stronger and stranger assumption. Thus, the failure of the first assertion seems
more natural. Therefrom Einstein’s conclusion that QT is ’incomplete’.
If Bell’s theorem is (erroneously) used to show that the first assertion is true, then the
breakdown of at least one of the fundamental scientific principles of ’locality’ or ’reality’
is a necessary consequence. Thus, certain strange features associated with single events
became a subject of intense research because they could now be described in terms of
c.f. a ’breakdown of locality’. Thus the strange (’weird’, ’magical’) features of QT which
always appear, whenever QT is used to describe single particles, became manifest once
again, but this time in a supposedly more definite form thanks to Bell’s theorem.
If, on the other hand, the two different meanings of the term ’completeness’ are clearly
distinguished from each other, then Bell’s proof of m-completeness cannot be used to
eliminate QT’s property of p-incompleteness. Then, the above Einstein alternative leads
to the same final conclusion as before, namely that an individuality interpretation of
QT does not exist. This means that QT is a statistical theory (probably complete in a
metaphysical sense, and certainly complete in a metaphysical sense as defined by Bell)
which by its very nature cannot be used to describe the behavior of single particles. The
’strangeness’ of QT is nothing but the consequence of an unjustified extension of its range
of validity. Typically, all the strange things never happen in the laboratory but always in
the brain of the interpreter.
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6 Conclusion
In the first part of this essay we found that a rational basis for several principles, believed
to support the philosophical basis of the CI, does not exist. The mysterious nature of
the CI, which contains undefined statements in its definition, can be expected to lead to
further obscurities whenever applied to single particles. This is indeed what happens. An
attempt by EPR to make the contradictory character of the CI explicit, i.e. to prove the
p-incompleteness of QT - or the non-existence of an individuality interpretation for QT -
was successful. Bell’s proof of m-completeness cannot be used to invalidate EPR’s proof of
p-incompleteness. Our final conclusion is that QT is p-incomplete and m-complete. The
common failure to distinguish the two different meanings of completeness is due to an old
’deterministic dogma’ which rules our thinking even today. This dogma invalidates, if true,
our final conclusion. However, this deterministic point of view is not a logical neccessity
but rather a historical grown intellectual habit. According to the present analysis it is
incompatible with the structure of QT and should be abandoned.
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